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The theory of normative reasoning schemes which J. Anthony Blair discusses
in his paper is a very promising field for informal logic and argumentation
theory. It is a commonplace that for an argument to be good from the logical
point of view, the premises must be acceptable, if not true, and they must be
properly connected to the conclusion. However, a general account of premise
acceptability and connection adequacy await development. The theory of
normative reasoning schemes could mark a major advance in a general
understanding of when premises are properly connected to conclusions. To
maximize such an advance, however, I believe those developing the reasoning
schemes project need to consider certain questions, which I would like to put
forward. Since in my own work I have been concentrating on the issue of
premise acceptability rather than connection adequacy, some of these
questions may already have been addressed in the literature. If so, I can only
apologize for restating what you already know. But reading Blair's account has
raised these questions for me and I believe they are important for developing
the theory of reasoning schemes properly.
1. If one reasoning scheme can be seen as a special case of another, what is
the rationale for distinguishing this particular case?
Consider the very first example of a reasoning scheme that Blair entertains, the
Appeal to a Source:
S says that P.
Normally, when S says that P, P.
So probably P.
Is this not a statistical syllogism? Can we not straightforwardly cast it in the
form
Z% of F's are G's.
a is F.
So probably a is G ?
Normally cases of S's saying that P are cases of P's being true.
This is a case of S's saying that P.
So probably this is a case of P's being true.
Have we misrepresented the reasoning by seeing it as instantiating this form?
How? What more could the analysis of this argument as an "Appeal to a
Source" reasoning scheme add to the preceding analysis? One answer
seems straightforward. Appeal to a Source arguments are statistical
syllogisms as a matter of form, but characterizing them as a particular case of
statistical syllogism, we can readily call up a list of critical questions which will
enable us to determine in these cases whether the ceteris paribus
qualification has been defeated. If so, we would have a significant rationale for
distinguishing this class of arguments. But this leads to a subsidiary question.
Are we marking a formal difference here, or an evaluative or dialectical
difference? Talk of argumentation schemata suggests talking about forms of
arguments. How do different sets of critical questions mark different forms? I
believe that those involved in the reasoning schemes project need to answer
this question. If our goal in developing a system of argumentation schemes is
to assist persons in acquiring truth and avoiding error through attending to
arguments, we must avoid unnecessarily multiplying argumentation schemes.
That would make the whole system unworkable. If many of the argumentation
schemes in a given system are special cases of the statistical syllogism, why
not simply replace all of these schemata with that for the statistical syllogism?
Lists of critical questions would then be determined by subject matter and not
be determinants of form.
2. Should the theory of reasoning schemes make contact with the theory of
presumption?
I believe it should. As Blair points out, the prototype argumentation scheme is
Toulmin's basic model
The connection with the Toulmin model goes even deeper. We may ask why
the warrant has authority. In many cases, especially in the reasoning whose
analysis and evaluation has prompted our turning to argumentation schemes,
the warrant expresses a presumption. Blair alludes to this in discussing why at
least in certain circumstances, it is reasonable to accept a proposition P on
the basis of someone's sayso. At least in some circumstances, there exists a
practice of truthfulness. But then in those circumstances, there would be a
presumption of trust. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call this to our attention
when they refer to "the presumption of natural trustfulness by which our first
reaction is to accept what someone tells us as being true, which is accepted
as long and insofar as we have no cause for distrust." (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 70-71) To be justified in accepting P on someone's
sayso, we also need a presumption of reliability. There must be a presumption
that the person can speak reliably about the issue of P. Is P a matter of
personal testimony? Personal testimony is based on perception and memory
for which, as Rescher points out, there is a presumption. (See Rescher 1977:
37) But to ask why a warrant has authority is to ask for its backing——another
element in Toulmin's model. The theory of presumption, then, can make a
contribution to understanding why warrants——at least in certain areas——are
suitably backed. (See Toulmin 1958: 103-104) (I believe it is better to talk of
backing here rather than entailment, as Blair does. He says that in some sense
of entailment, "the practice of truthfulness entails P for R in C when S tells R
that P in C." But is it best to use a word frequently reserved for a deductive
relation to describe this relation? Furthermore, as Toulmin points out, how
various warrants are backed is field dependent. How one establishes the
authority of a warrant varies from field to field. Hence, there would be no unitary
sense of entailment here to characterize the relation. But what backings have
in common is to establish why reasoning according to a particular warrant is
legitimate, why the warrant has "authority" or "currency." (See Toulmin 1958:
103.) The practice of truth-telling or the presumption of truthfulness work in the
same way.)
There is an even stronger reason for making contact with the theory of
presumption. As Blair points out, the reasoning we are analysing and
evaluating through argumentation schemes is defeasible. Our premises justify
accepting a conclusion, all things being equal. But all things need not be equal.
Our warrants have excepting conditions——Toulmin's rebuttals. (This is a well
recognized epistemic category. Some epistemologists point out that
arguments have defeaters. In the default situation, the argument is cogent, but
a defeater may undercut the cogency of the argument.) It is here, I believe, that
the theory of reasoning or argumentation schemes has the potential to be a
major contribution to the practice of analysing and evaluating arguments. As
Blair points out, it is possible to outline in a general way for any scheme the
principal classes of exceptions, and so to provide useful guidance for the
employment of that scheme. And that is the role of the so-called "critical
questions" associated with each reasoning scheme....The critical questions
function as a check-list to help determine whether any of the standard types of
excepting conditions that should cancel the default [are] present in the given
case.
The critical questions then let us identify what rebuttals could operate with a
given type of argument. In approaching argument evaluation, then, instead of
asking the general question of whether any rebuttals are operating here, or
whether there are any rebuttals which the proponent of the argument should
have countered, we have a list of critical questions to identify rebuttals.
I believe that these lists of critical questions are connected with the issue of
presumption in a way that has significant implications for the theory of
argumentation. Whose responsibility is it to ask these critical questions? One
obvious answer is that it is the responsibility of the challenger or critical
evaluator of the argument. This is well and good. But suppose the challenger
asks these questions and finds that the proponent has not answered some of
these questions in the course of the argument. Perhaps he has addressed
none. Does that means the argument is flawed, defeated? Was it the
proponent's responsibility to consider each question on this list and to counter
through argumentation in each case the rebuttal or defeater these questions
raise? Suppose there is a presumption——at least in the circumstances
where the argument is put forward and received——that the excepting,
rebutting, defeating conditions identified by the critical questions do not hold.
Then why should the proponent of the argument have the responsibility to point
this out? If the presumption is that the rebutting conditions do not hold, then the
burden of proof is not on the proponent to show that they do not hold and his
not addressing them constitutes no fault in his argument. On the other hand, if
there is not a presumption that some of these conditions identified by the
critical questions do not hold, the proponent's not countering them does
constitute a fault.
This highlights the importance of the theory of presumption for argument
evaluation. Just when is there a presumption that a rebutting condition does not
hold? Answering that question obviously depends on identifying the rebutting
condition——the theory of normative reasoning schemes——and having a
suitably developed theory of presumption. The two need to work together for a
proper approach to argument evaluation.
The issue of the relation between the theory of reasoning schemes and the
theory of presumption is important also for the issue of when beliefs are
justified. Suppose a challenger comes to believe P because it is the
conclusion of an argument which has been presented to her. Is that belief
justified, is the challenger not rational in accepting this belief without reviewing
the critical questions posed by the argumentation scheme which that argument
instantiated? Must the challenger convince herself, or at least consciously note
to herself, that no rebutting condition defeats the argument before she is
justified in accepting its conclusion? I believe this would put too heavy a burden
on the challenger. If there is a presumption that defeating conditions do not
hold and the challenger is aware of no evidence to defeat that presumption,
why then is she not justified in accepting the conclusion of the argument on the
basis of the premises? The conclusion follows, all things being equal, and the
challenger is aware of no evidence that all things are not equal. Obviously,
whether or not one judges that the challenger's accepting or believing the
conclusion is justified depends on one's account of epistemic justification.
What these last considerations illustrate is that the issues or reasoning or
argumentation schemes, presumption, and justification are all interrelated.
This leads me to a further question for the normative reasoning schemes
project.
3. How may we distinguish a piece of evidence's being a reason for C and
someone X's reasoning to C from a proposition P asserting that evidence?
I am bothered by Blair's Appeal to a Source reasoning schema, because it
suggests to me an overly illative picture of our belief-generating mechanisms. If
someone tells me that it is nine o'clock and I come to believe that it is nine
o'clock on the person's sayso, does it follow that I have inferred that it is nine
o'clock from the fact that the persons has said it is nine o'clock? Do I invariably
come to hold my belief that it is nine o'clock through reasoning? It seems to me
that in most cases, forming a belief that P on the basis of someone's saying
that P is a case of forming a basic belief. We may draw an analogy with
perception. I am appeared to in a certain way. I form a belief about the external
world. Does this mean that I have inferred, reasoned to that belief from the
proposition that I have been appeared to in a certain way? If I am aware of no
such argument, reasoning, or inference then, without a good case that I have
nonetheless engaged in such reasoning, to describe my belief-generating
mechanism as involving inference would misdescribe it. This does not mean
that I came to hold my belief about the external world without evidence. My
experience, how I was appeared to, is the evidence. Similarly, my hearing you
tell me that it is nine o'clock constitutes evidence that it is, and I may come to
believe that it is nine o'clock on the basis of that evidence. But it does not
follow that I have inferred that it is nine o'clock from the proposition that you
have told me it is nine o'clock. My belief is basic, not inferred.
This explains why I am bothered when Blair says "Your reasoning, `It is
probably around nine o'clock because my partner tells me it is around nine
o'clock (and there is no reason to doubt him)' is excellent reasoning," or when
he speaks of "`P is true because S says so'" reasoning." Is this how we
reason? On the basis of someone's sayso or testimony, are not the beliefs we
form ordinarily basic beliefs? I think it is important that any theory of reasoning
be informed by an account of how we come to formulate our beliefs and which
ones involve mechanisms generating basic beliefs and which ones involve
inference. Without this, we risk artificiality in our account of reasoning
schemes. We might put forward reasoning schemes which do not, at least in
many cases, reflect how we come to hold certain beliefs. Even if we do, on
occasion, reason according to one of these artificial schemes in forming a
belief on the basis of a certain kind of evidence, that we standardly form beliefs
based on this evidence in a basic way could lead us to give undue prominence
to this argumentation scheme and thus distort our classification of
argumentation schemes.
There is one further question I would like to pose to the project of normative
reasoning schemes and in some ways it may be the most important. It is
related to the first.
4. How many basic or primitive reasoning schemes are there? Once these
basic schemes are identified, can one develop a comprehensive method for
evaluating most, if not all, arguments we meet with in everyday life by means
of these basic schemes and their associated critical questions?
As Blair described it, Walton has identified twenty-five argumentation
schemes. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have identified three basic
schemes. This situation is far from satisfactory. Blair points out that "Walton's
list of 25 turned out to contain a quite small number of subsets, each of which
could be distinguished by being a variation of a single general warranting
principle." How many of these subsets were identified? Were there more than
three? What is the relation between these subsets and van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's three basic schemata? If these questions have not been
answered already, I hope they will be given a high priority by those engaged in
developing an account of normative reasoning schemata.
These then are four questions for those engaged in the normative reasoning
schemes project. I believe this project is extremely important for the overall
developing of informal logic and argumentation theory. It promises to give a
comprehensive account of connection adequacy for most arguments in
everyday contexts, the arguments of the polis, the central focus of informal
logic. We offer these questions then in the hope that they will aid in developing
a theoretically adequate account of normative reasoning schemes.
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